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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
construed the Nardone case as setting forth the rule that Section 605
of the Federal Communications Act applies only to interstate com-
munications intercepted by government agents by tapping wires, and,
therefore, intrastate communications obtained in the same way are
admissible as evidence. The instant case is in accordance with the
decision in Valli v. United States, but is opposed to the decision in
the Sablowsky case.17
It is true that Congress has power to prohibit federal agents from
divulging intrastate wire communications in district courts of the
United States. Congress may impose legislation affecting intrastate
commerce whenever it is necessary as a means of exercising control of
interstate and foreign commerce.:' Whether Congress embodied such
an intention in Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act,
remains unsettled.
The instant case is now before the Supreme Court of the United
States on a writ of certiorari to decide the conflict which has arisen
among the various circuit courts of appeal in construing Section 605
of the Federal Communications Act.
M. B.
INTERSTATE MOTOR CARRIERS-STATE REGULATION-BURDEN
ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE-VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE OF CONSTITUTION.-For the collection of a tax on one of
defendant's trucks, pursuant to the Georgia Maintenance Tax Act,'
plaintiff obtained an execution and levied upon that vehicle. Defen-
dant, a common carrier for hire engaged exclusively in interstate
transportation by motor vehicle, is authorized by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission to use the state highway system, 2 but such author-
ization does not extend to the use of the rural post roads. The Geor-
gia Act directs that the tax money be used for the maintenance of the
§ 605, decided that federal agents were included thereunder and that interstate
communications obtained by wire tapping were inadmissible as evidence.
17 The Court in this case interpreted the Nardrne case as creating a rule
of evidence excluding federal agents from divulging intercepted wire com-
munications. They contended that such a rule of exclusion should apply to
federal agents in regard to intercepted intrastate communications.
Is Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 32 Sup. Ct. 2 (1911).
1Ga. Laws 1937, pp. 155-167. The Act requires that all who own or have
exclusive right to use for more than 30 days a motor bus, truck, or trailer
"shall pay a maintenance tax for the operation *** upon and over the public
roads of this State".
2 MOTOR CARRIER AcT, 49 STAT. 55 (1935), 49 U. S. C. A. § 301 (Supp.
1938). Evidently federal regulation under the Act is not adequate, for the
court interpreted subsection (c) of Section 302 as preserving both the right of
a state to regulate traffic on the highways as an incident of its police power,
and the right of taxation to conserve its highways. Lowe v. Stoutamire, 123
Fla. 135, 166 So. 310 (1936).
[ VOL. 14
RECENT DECISIONS
rural post roads, and provides for a tax rate on vehicles used to haul
for hire, which is more than twice as much as that imposed upon
vehicles used to haul not for hire. Defendant filed an affidavit of
illegality, asserting that the tax is an unreasonable fee for its use of
the highways, and that the tax schedule discriminates against carriers
for hire in favor of those not for hire. A dismissal of the affidavit
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia. On appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. A tax imposed on
motor vehicles engaged in interstate commerce, as a fee for the use of
the state highways, is not an unreasonable burden on such commerce.
The equal protection clause is not violated, in the absence of a showing
of a lack of facts to justify the discriminative classification in the tax
schedule. Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. State Revenue Commission of
Georgia, 306 U. S. 72, 59 Sup. Ct. 435 (1939).
A state may not directly regulate, prohibit or burden interstate
commerce. 3 But a state may exact a reasonable charge as compen-
sation for the privilege of using that which it maintains. 4 Accord-
ingly, a state may place restrictions on operators of motor vehicles,
engaged in interstate commerce, whose use of the highways is inju-
rious and presents a source of danger to the health and safety of its
citizens.5 When Maryland required all operators of automobiles on
its highways to secure a permit to drive and a license for the car, it
was held that the provisions were reasonable regulations in preventing
the destruction of the highways and a proper exercise of the state's
police power.6
In 1935, Congress made its first and, to date, only attempt to
regulate interstate motor commerce.7 In the absence of any action
3 U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have power * * * to regu-
late commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states * * * ").
4 See Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 623, 35 Sup. Ct. 140 (1915).
This rule was applied in the following cases: Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S.
160, 37 Sup. Ct. 30 (1916) ; Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Comm'n,
295 U. S. 285, 55 Sup. Ct. 709 (1935) ; Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U. S. 407, 56
Sup. Ct. 756 (1936).
5 See note 5, mtpra; State v. Darazzo, 97 Conn. 728, 118 Atl. 81 (1922)(recognizing, as a special subject for legislative regulation, the use of the
highways by common carriers using motor vehicles).
6 Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 35 Sup. Ct. 140 (1915); see
Ketcheroet v. City of Dubuque, 158 Iowa 631, 138 N. W. 540 (1912) (when a
city maintained a wharf on a navigable river between the states and imposed
wharfage fees on ships plying between those states, it was held not to be an
interference with interstate commerce).
7 See Continental Casualty Co. v. Shankel, 88 F. (2d) 819, 823 (C. C. A.
10th, 1937) (no federal legislation before 1935).
Because of the development of co-ordinated nation-wide systems of motor
transportation, which the several states could not adequately regulate, Con-
gressional action resulted in the MOTOR CARRIER AcT, 49 STAT. 55 (1935), 49
U. S. C. A. § 301 (Supp. 1938). The main purpose of this Act is to regulate
the larger transportation systems, whose operations are nation-wide or extend
through several states. Several concessions are made to state regulation, exhib-
iting a trend toward concurrent operation of federal and state legislation.
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until that time, and in view of the inadequacy of federal regulation,8
how much control may the states exercise over such commerce? It
has been declared that state regulations must be reasonable and prop-
erly within the exercise of the police power.9 In other words, unless
the law affords compensation for the use of the highways or promotes
safety, it is invalid,10 and unless this appears affirmatively, it is a direct
burden on interstate commerce." In a later case, 12 a district court
decided that a common carrier by motor vehicle engaged in interstate
commerce was not exempt from getting a state certificate of necessity
and convenience. The Supreme Court later reversed the district
court, because the refusal to issue the certificate was a direct burden
on interstate commerce. The Court, while recognizing the power of
the state to regulate the use of the highways in order to conserve them
and promote safety, held that by adopting provisions, seemingly to
achieve the above purpose, a state cannot control competition in inter-
state commerce. The courts will look into the purpose of such legis-
lation, and presumptive validity will not be given the statute merely
because it falls on vehicles using the highways.' 3
In the instant case, however, the question is not whether the tax
is levied as a charge for the use of the highways, but whether the
charge is reasonable. The allocation of the tax money to the rural
post roads does not invalidate the tax, for the state in the conduct of
its fiscal affairs may use all or part of the money for any purpose.14
The Court found that the evidence introduced by the defendant, to
show that the total of charges was an unreasonable fee for the privi-
lege granted, was inadequate; and, in the absence of such proof, a
mere inspection of the statute will not suffice to declare the tax an
8 See note 2, supra.
9 Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 35 Sup. Ct. 140 (1915).1o See Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570, 576,
45 Sup. Ct. 191 (1925) (Enjoining the application of a statute, imposing upon
a private carrier the duties and strict liability of a common carrier and the
obligation of furnishing cargo insurance. If applied, the Act would violate the
commerce clause of the Constitution, since such regulations have no bearing on
public safety or the collection of compensation for the use of the highways).
Cf. Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163, 172, 48 Sup. Ct. 502 (1928) where
Justice Brandeis said, "such provisions for insurance are not, even as applied
to busses engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, an unreasonable burden
on that commerce, if limited to damages suffered within the state by persons
other than the passenger."
11 See Interstate Transit v. Lindsey, 283 U. S. 183, 186, 51 Sup. Ct. 380(1931) (holding invalid, as a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate
commerce, a tax on motor vehicles which bears no relation to the wear and
tear on highways and which provides for the money to go into the general
funds of the state).
12 Buck v. Kuykendall, 295 Fed. 197 (D. C. Wash. 1924), reV'd, 267 U. S.
307, 45 Sup. Ct. 324 (1925) (state attempted to exclude unnecessary competing
carriers by refusing to issue the certificate on the ground that the road was
already adequately served).
13 See Interstate Transit v. Lindsey, 283 U. S. 183, 186, 51 Sup. Ct. 380
(1931).
14 See Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554, 557, 45 Sup. Ct. 702 (1927).
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unreasonable burden.15 The defendant could not prove that the classi-
fication in the tax schedule was discriminative without showing that
in actual practice the tax fell with undue weight on it; 16 for if there is
any conceivable reason to justify the classification, it will be upheld.' 7
It is only reasonable to assume that those engaged in hauling for hire
will make more extensive use of the highways than private carriers.
Where motor vehicles use the highways to carry on a business they
are properly chargeable with a greater tax for such use.'
B. J. S.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-AGE DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED
AMONG CIVIL SERVICE APPLICANTs.-The Municipal Civil Service
Commission announced that applications for the position of porter,
labor class, would be received and that appointments would be made
according to priority. The Commission prescribed an age limit as
"under 46 years of age on date of application, and under 50 years of
age on date of appointment." Nine thousand applications were ac-
cepted and one hundred received physical examinations. The peti-
tioner, fifty-one years of age, did not file an application, although he
had notice of the announcement. One week after applications were
closed, petitioner sought to cancel the entire list on the ground that
the Commission had committed a void act by prescribing an age limit
in violation of the Civil Service Law § 25A.1 The Appellate Division
affirmed an order of the Special Term cancelling the applications. On
appeal, held, reversed. The petitioner is precluded from maintaining
this proceeding, since he was guilty of laches, in that he waited until
I5 See Interstate Buses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U. S. 245, 251, 48 Sup. Ct.
230 (1928).
16 Ibid.
27 See Ogilvie v. Hailey, 141 Tenn. 392, 210 S. W. 645, 647 (1919).
18 See Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554, 557, 47 Sup. Ct. 702 (1927).
' N. Y. CIVIL SERVICE LAW § 25A. "Applicants for Civil Service Posi-
tions; age discrimination prohibited.
"Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, except as herein
provided, neither the State Civil Service Commission nor any Municipal Civil
Service Commission shall hereafter prohibit, prevent, disqualify or discriminate
against any person who is physically and mentally qualified from competing,
participating or registering for a civil service competitive or promotional
examination or from qualifying for a position in the classified civil service by
reason of his or her age. Any such rule, or requirement, resolution or regula-
tion of such state or Municipal Commission shall be void.
"Nothing herein contained, however, shall prevent such state or Municipal
Commission from adopting reasonable minimum or maximum age requirements
for positions such as policeman, fireman, prison guard, or other positions which
require extraordinary physical effort, except where age limits for such positions
are already prescribed by law."
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